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It is impossible for me to begin this short talk with
anything other than a heartfelt thank-you to the
members of this association for making me the
recipient of this year’s Award for Outstanding
Public Service Through Economics. I’m not the
kind of person who gets awards and, as with many
of the honors given to government figures in
Washington, DC, from which I hail, it’s undeserved!
You should note, however, that I came to Halifax
yesterday afternoon to be sure I was here to receive
the award today, so I hope you know how pleased
and honored I am to be here.
My interest in economics dates back to the
summer of 1953, an easy date to remember this
year because it was exactly three cycles ago of the
17-year cicada infestation we have been enduring in
my part of the world. After the cicadas had almost
all died, I collected hundreds of them in a large
glass jar and went door-to-door in my neighbor-
hood in Park Forest, Illinois, trying to sell them. My
mother, who had never gone to college, much less
taken an economics course, took me aside after a
day on which I’d come home disconsolate, having
sold not a single cicada carcass. She said, “Paul, if
anyone is silly enough to want dead cicadas, there
are millions of them lying around. They’re not
going to fetch a very good price, and you might
want to consider something different to earn money
for your baseball cards.” Thus was the iron law of
supply and demand first driven home to me!
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My interest in putting economics to the service
of public policy came much later in life, and it is
attributable to two things. The first is the well-
known economic doctrine of comparative advan-
tage: while I was a perfectly competent researcher,
I never felt I was as good a theoretician or applied
econometrician as my wonderfully bright colleagues
at Resources for the Future (RFF). I was relatively
better, though, at thinking about how the tools and
techniques they were developing could be used to
improve the country’s policy “toolkit,” and inter-
ested as well in how this could be explained to non-
economists in such a way as to whet their appetite
for what I considered to be more enlightened public
policy. A second impetus to policy involvement, of
course, was the advantage of working six blocks
from the White House and three short miles from
both the Capitol and the EPA. Believe me when I
say that I have seen far too many examples of
misguided policy in my nearly 33 years in
Washington not to want to at least try to improve
things a little.
I have chosen as the subject of this short talk
today, “The Obligations of a Policy Economist.” It
is my hope to exhort rather than to preach, and I’ll
be pleased if my remarks give you pause to think
about the way you lead your professional life, even
if they do not spur you to make any changes.
The first obligation I want to identify is straight-
forward enough: be very clear about what economics
can and cannot tell us, and clear as well about the
premises upon which it is based. For example, I
occasionally hear economists talk as if—or even
say directly that—a benefit-cost analysis is a suffi-
cient basis for making an environmental policy
decision. In my view, and I hope in the view of all
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of you here, this is poppycock. To be sure, a good
benefit-cost analysis can be and, I would argue,
should be a part of the information base upon which
any important environmental or natural resource
decision is made. But anyone who believes that
allocative efficiency is or even ought to be the only
basis for policy making will find little support from
most good economists. Naturally, we might all
prefer a world in which pure distributional politics
plays a smaller role in environmental and natural
resource policy than it does today. But it’s hard to
deny the importance of taking into account the
identity of those who win and those who lose from
even an efficient policy change.
Other considerations matter, as well. For instance,
society would no doubt always prohibit the selling
of one’s vote, even if a benefit-cost analysis sug-
gested there were enough eager buyers and sellers
that such a measure might pass the test. Finally,
laws are sometimes written in such a way as to
preclude the consideration of costs in environ-
mental standard-setting, as is the case under Section
109 of the Clean Air Act in the United States. In
these cases, not only is benefit-cost analysis an
insufficient basis for decision making, it would be
illegal to use it even as one input in that process.
We also have an obligation to be open and
honest about the assumptions on which such tools
as benefit-cost analysis are based. For instance, we
economists generally accept without much thought
that the social value of a proposed policy change at
any one time is the sum of the values attached to
that change by the individuals who comprise the
society. But this means, of course, that in a society
of philistines in which no individual cares a whit
about the Grand Canyon, there is no value to
preserving it in the face of a proposal to convert it
to a parking lot for Las Vegas. Non-economists find
this notion quite troubling, and we need to acknow-
ledge and confront this. Similarly, the benefit from
protecting a super-rich rock star from an air pollu-
tion-related health risk will, technically speaking,
be greater than that of protecting a poor day-laborer
because willingness to pay is contingent upon one’s
income. If I’m not the only one here uncomfortable
with that notion, I’ll be quite surprised. Policy econ-
omists often gloss over the value-laden assumptions
upon which applied welfare analysis is based, even
when we shouldn’t.
A second obligation of policy economists is to
fully portray both the pros and the cons (the
benefits and costs, that is) of the policy options
under consideration. This is easy to do if one is
undertaking an analysis on one’s own, as in an
academic paper. In such cases as these, there is no
reason to give short shrift to one or another policy
consequence. Indeed, we often undertake studies
like this to answer for ourselves the question,
“Hmmm, I wonder if this is a good idea or not.”
More often than not, though, one undertakes eco-
nomic analysis for a client or sponsor. This might
be a government agency, a philanthropic foundation,
a corporation, or perhaps a public interest advocacy
organization. In these cases, our client has a “horse
in the race,” to use an old expression, and is
probably hoping our analysis will come out in a
particular way. It’s the job of the policy economist
to speak truth to power, as the late Aaron
Wildavsky put it, and make clear not just the
beneficial effects of the favored policy option, but
also its costs.
This has become particularly important in what
I’ll call the “win-win era,” a time in which favored
policy options are generally described as benefiting
everyone—rich and poor, black and white, tall and
short, etc. But I’ve never seen a win-win policy in
which at least someone doesn’t lose his shirt. To be
sure, sometimes the losers are not particularly
sympathetic parties. Doing away with agricultural
subsidies is often described as being a win-win
policy—good, that is, for both the environment and
for those farmers in underdeveloped countries who
can’t make a living in agriculture because of the
competition from subsidized agriculture in the
United States and Europe. But doing away with
such subsidies is surely a loss for the farmers
receiving them—generally the wealthy owners of
large, corporate-like farms, since they get the
largest subsidies. I may not lie awake at night
worrying about their fate, but they would surely be
losers from that particular win-win policy none-
theless.
Consider another example. During the nearly two
years I spent as Chief Economist at the Council on
Environmental Quality in the Executive Office of
the President, I was once asked to write something
glowing about what would today be called a “win-
win-win” policy (a 50% improvement on the simple
win-win!). The idea was to have the government
subsidize through income tax credits the cost of
corporate investments in pollution control. This was
an idea that had enthusiastic support from the
manufacturing sector (for obvious reasons), from
organized labor (which believed that there would be
fewer jobs lost in manufacturing due to regulation-
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(who wouldn’t have to fight so hard with business
over the high cost of pollution control). From the
standpoint of the champion of this idea, truly a win-
win-win. The trouble with such tax credits, of course,
was that they would have promoted more invest-
ment in polluting industries than was optimal, and
left taxpayers paying for a share of pollution control
rather than either those buying the products of the
polluting firms or the shareholders of those firms.
I said that I would have to include a discussion of
these latter effects in any serious analysis of the
subsidy idea, for which I was scolded for not being
a team player.
A third obligation of a policy economist, I believe,
requires us to do something that doesn’t come
naturally to many of us. It is to think beyond “this
is the optimal policy” to “here’s how it might be
designed to work in the real world,” and even occa-
sionally to “here’s what could be done to lessen the
burdens on (and blunt the political opposition from)
those who would lose from the proposed policy
change.” In fact, I think the single greatest failing
of most policy economists—myself included,
certainly—is an unwillingness to roll up our sleeves
and work with the lawyers and others who are
charged with the actual drafting of environmental
and natural resource policies. In other words, it is
often unnatural for us to immerse ourselves in the
institutional details of lawmaking and regulation-
writing. And sometimes the professional payoffs
from doing so, especially for economists in aca-
demia, are small or even nonexistent.
Believe me, it’s a very long journey indeed from
the insight that the issuance of marketable permits
for CO2 emissions (or the imposition of a carbon
tax) is the best way to control that pollutant to the
actual legislative and regulatory language that spells
out how a carbon mitigation program will work.
Unless policy economists are willing to stay
involved in this process throughout, it is likely that
language will be written which, either wittingly or
unwittingly, creates a radical departure from the
intellectually appealing policy that one of us has
concocted. During the debate in 1989S90 about the
form that a sulfur dioxide emissions trading program
would take in the revised Clean Air Act, it was the
advocacy group Environmental Defense, more than
Resources for the Future or any other group of aca-
demic economists, that played a key role in the
legislative design which proved to be so successful.
We are fortunate it is one of the few such advocacy
groups that has always employed well-trained econ-
omists to help advance its work.
Policy economists should be involved as well in
figuring out ways to compensate the losers from an
efficient policy: this is often seen as much less
interesting than designing the policy—beneath us,
even. Yet how many times have we seen a policy
with significantly positive net benefits not enacted
because the prospective losers are identifiable and
well organized, while the winners are dispersed and
unorganized? Isn’t this exactly why it is so difficult
to do away with the agricultural subsidies I men-
tioned above, as well as those in forestry, grazing,
and water policy, to name but a few?
There are some examples from which we might
learn. When the Redwood National Park was
created in the United States some years back, the
loggers whose jobs would disappear as a result of
curtailed logging were compensated for their loss
with a gradually decreasing series of payments over
a five-year period. Similarly, when the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990 were written, a $500
million fund was created to compensate high-sulfur
coal miners whose jobs were affected by the shift
from high- to low-sulfur coal in utility boilers
throughout the midwestern and eastern United States.
Far from being a mundane task, policy economists
ought to relish the challenge of designing compen-
satory schemes that make it possible for their ideas
to be implemented in the real world, rather than
exist as mere curiosa in classrooms, journal articles,
and textbooks.
I have identified here three obligations of policy
economists. I suppose I could have identified more,
as might each of you, though I think the ones I have
touched upon would be near the top of anyone’s
list. As your lunchtime speaker this afternoon, and
especially as your honoree this year, I have a fourth
obligation—one I am delighted to discharge. That
is to thank you once again for asking me to be with
you here today and to say how grateful I am to you
for having done so.